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Abstract 
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the offset negotiations under the conditions of bilateral 
oligopoly. The analysis is conducted in a game-theoretical model of offset offers in the static and in the 
dynamic framework. The model allows to discuss the incentives for the defense contractors to use different 
size of offset packets in the bidding process for defense contracts. The results lead to the conclusion that the 
attempts of some governments to coordinate multilateral reduction of offset packages have a low chance of 
success in the contemporary defense markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Offset transactions are considered to be the most complex type of countertrade. By definition, they are 
compensation practices used in procurement of military equipment or services. Since the beginning of 1990s a 
rapid increase of their share in the world trade has been observed. Inevitably, the intensity of offset demands is 
strongly related to the end of the cold war period.†  
An increase in the scope and scale of use of the offset agreements became a focus of analysis not only by 
practitioners, but also by a number of academic researchers.‡ This type of countertrade is heavily criticized by 
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such organizations as WTO, World Bank, and IMF. The arguments against them are related to the 
destabilization of international trade and payment system. 
Offset transactions are accused of being a sign of bilateralism in trade relations. Moreover, they are 
perceived as a form of trade accompanied by such negative phenomena as inefficient change of trade flows, 
use of restrictive practices, and causing distortions of international economic exchange. However, it should be 
mentioned that some analysts perceive them as a chance for less developed countries to catch up with the 
more advanced economies. 
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the offset negotiations under the conditions of bilateral 
oligopoly. The analysis is conducted in a game-theoretical model of offset offers in the static and in the 
dynamic framework. The model allows to discuss the incentives for the defense contractors to use different 
size of offset packets in the bidding process for defense contracts. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the growing phenomenon of offsets obligations and 
demands is presented. The model of offset offers is analyzed in section 3. Additional incentives for the 
proliferation of offsets are discussed in section 4. Section 5 contains the final conclusions. 
2. Global proliferation of offsets 
The growing practice of demanding compensation in the process of negotiation the defense purchases has 
been observed since 1990s. Rising military investments in the developing countries will lead defense 
suppliers to fulfill offset obligations valued at approximately USD 100 billion between 2012 and 2022 in 
markets beyond EU and USA.§ 
The leading defense producers from the USA (Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop 
Grumman and Rytheon) are likely to accumulate obligations of around USD 42 billion. As an example, it 
could be mentioned that the biggest defense producer Lockheed Martin is expected to fulfill its obligations to 
offset partners of USD 23,7 billion (see fig. 1). The offset commitments of EADS are estimated at USD 6,27 
billion. It should be stressed that more than 23 countries introduced formal programs between 2000 and 2011 
demanding offset benefits when placing defense purchases. Currently 80 countries worldwide impose some 
form of obligation on defense suppliers. According to IHS Jane’s DS Forecast, the world defense export 
market increased 38 per cent from USD 34 billion in 2008 to USD 47 billion in 2012. 
 
 
 
§ Compare Anderson and Moore, 2013. 
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Fig. 1. Offset obligations of selected major defense contractors, 2012-2022 (USD million).  
Source: IHS Jane’s Defence Industry and Markets / 2013 
Offset obligations of the biggest American defense contractors to selected countries in 2012-2020 are 
shown in fig. 2. According to the presented data, the significant buyers of defense systems are first of all the 
governments, and to some extent their activity contributes to the creation of offset obligation. Using its market 
power, the government is entitled to accept the offer characterized by the lowest price, or contains offset 
benefits, or is a combination of the above. 
It should be stressed that the governments of the countries acquiring the newest defense systems capture 
part of the surplus generated by the suppliers through substantial R&D investments and their key 
competences. The differences in the key competences, advancement in technology, and R&D expenditures are 
the most visible in the technologically highly advanced products, for which the imitation is very difficult. In 
the perfectly competitive markets, the price of such products equals to the long-run marginal and average 
manufacturing costs. Thus, there is no surplus to be taken over. In such market structures, the offsets would 
unnecessarily raise the costs without any significant benefits for the procuring government. 
Offset demands are mostly observed in the military sector, aviation, telecommunication, and the IT 
sector.** In these industries, the firms compete in the oligopolistic environment.†† On the demand side, there is 
a relatively small number of buyers. It should be noticed that in the market for the most specialized and 
advanced aviation products less than 20 customers are active. It creates a significant market power for the 
small number of the acquiring governments (oligopsony). The existence of the buyer’s market in the 
governmental procurement along with the strategic independence of a small number of suppliers of 
technologically highly advanced products leads to the formation of bilateral oligopoly in offsets. 
 
 
 
**  In practice, many governments demand offsets also in the procurement of non-military goods. Offset requirements in these countries, 
e.g., Indonesia, are obligatory for the foreign purchases above certain level of expenditures, e.g., 5 USD million. 
†† See, e.g. Markusen, 2002. 
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Fig. 2. Offset obligations of the US defence contractors to selected beneficiaries to be delivered in 2012-2022 (USD million).  
Source: IHS Jane’s Defence Industry and Markets / 2013 
3. A model of offset offers 
A simple game known as the prisoner’s dilemma allows to better understand the essence of bilateral 
oligopoly in the context of offsets.‡‡ Let’s consider the market for technologically advanced fighter jets. The 
market is dominated by fighters F-35 produced by Lockheed Martin and Eurofighter-2000 supplied by the 
European consortium (EC). We assume that both suppliers have identical average costs of manufacturing. 
Even though products are differentiated, the majority of buyers perceive quality of jets as similar to each 
other. Thus the price competition is the most significant determinant of the market shares. 
Suppose that the government of a given country announces that it will choose the supplier of jets based on 
the price level and the size of offset packet. As mentioned earlier, most of the governmental decision makers 
request offsets as a part of the purchase. Some governments directly state in their regulations that in the 
evaluation process the value of offset packet will be more important than the price itself.§§ 
When both offset offers are identical, we could expect that the firms will evenly split the market of a given 
country. Thus in a hypothetical payoff matrix given in fig. 3, when both firms attach a small offset packet 
(SOP), each of them will earn profit of the size ሺߨȀʹሻ. A firm offering a large offset packet (LOP) when the 
competitor offers a SOP, would capture the entire market and receive profit of ሺͳ െ ߮ሻߨ, where ߮ ൌ ሺܮܱܲ െ
ܱܵܲሻȀߨ denotes the share of additional costs of LOP in the industry profit. It must be stressed that, in this 
 
 
‡‡ See, e.g., (Tadelis, 2013, pp. 48-51). 
§§ For example, in the governmental purchases from foreign companies, the Check Republic attached the weight of 60 percent to the 
offset packets, and the weight of only 40 percent to the price and the type of technology used. 
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case, the firm which offers a SOP will not register any sales, i.e. its profit will be zero. When both firms offer 
a LOP, each of them will receive ሺͳ െ ߮ሻߨȀʹ. 
 
  EC 
  SOP LOP 
 
 
LM 
 
 
SOP ߨȀʹ, ߨȀʹ 0, ሺͳ െ ߮ሻߨ 
 
LOP ሺͳ െ ߮ሻߨ, 0 ሺͳ െ ߮ሻߨȀʹ, ሺͳ െ ߮ሻߨȀʹ 
Fig. 3. One-shot offset competition. 
In a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, both firms offer large offset packets, because these strategies are 
dominant. It is easy to see that when both firms offer small offset packets, each of them will be able to obtain 
a higher net profit. Thus, the Nash equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the SOP strategies. Unfortunately, the 
cooperative strategies, i.e., SOP, are not stable, because each firm has incentives to offer a large offset packet. 
However, these considerations are based on a static approach to the competition between defense companies 
offering offset packets. 
It is important to analyze the above game in a dynamic framework. Suppose that the firms compete in each 
period t according to the above one-shot game. The discount factor, ߜ ሺͲ ൑ ߜ ൑ ͳሻ, is assumed to be identical 
for both companies. The game is played in an infinite horizon, which may create incentives for the companies 
to cooperate. They could make an agreement to offer only small offset packets. Such cooperation would allow 
each firm to earn profits with the present discounted value equal: 
గ
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ଶሺଵିఋሻ                                        (1) 
Should one firm break the collusive agreement and offered a large offset packet, it would earn profit of 
ሺͳ െ ߮ሻߨ this period. But, starting from the next period, the companies would offer only large offset packets 
and earn net profit of ሺͳ െ ߮ሻߨȀʹ  in every period afterwards. Thus the total profit from breaking the 
cooperation would have the present discounted value of: 
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The colluding companies will have no reason to depart from their commitments to offer small offset 
packets as long as the cooperative profits are bigger than the noncooperative ones, i.e.: 
గ
ଶሺଵିఋሻ ൒ ሺͳ െ ߮ሻ
గ
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ଵିఋ                                                                    (3) 
hence 
ߜ ൒ ଵିଶఝଵିఝ  .                                                                                  (4) 
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Table 1 gives the lowest values of the discount factor, ߜ, necessary to facilitate the collusion among the 
defense suppliers for various levels of the share of additional costs of LOP in the industry profit (parameter 
߮). As long as the discount factor is not smaller than ଵିଶఝଵିఝ  , the companies will offer only small offset packets. 
   Table 1. An example of a table. 
࣐ ૚ െ ૛࣐૚ െ࣐  Cooperation likelihood 
0 1,00  
0,1 0,89 Low chance of cooperation 
0,2 
0,3 
0,4 
0,5 
0,75 
0,57 
0,33 
0,00 
 
Increasing chance of cooperation 
 
Always cooperate 
   Source: own calculations 
It follows from table 1 that when the share of additional costs of LOP in the industry profit, ߮, is low, the 
minimum values for the discount factor, ߜ, are relatively high, i.e. the chance for a cooperation to be sustained 
is relatively small. When the share of additional costs of LOP in the industry profit, ߮, becomes larger, the 
minimum requirement for the discount factor, ߜ, is less demanding, i.e. we may expect firms to offer lower 
amounts of offsets. 
4. Additional incentives for offsets 
 There exist more reasons why the offset packets remain substantial, and it will be hard to limit them. The 
firms characterized by the high manufacturing costs loose part of the market share when they compete in price 
with the low-cost companies. The high-cost firms have incentives to set the price at a high level, and compete 
by other means. The implementation of offsets may require some skills which the low-cost companies do not 
posses, or their abilities are limited. Often, it is the case of an indirect offset when the seller is obliged to 
render some services in the areas not connected directly to the basic product. Thus, the high-cost company 
may win the contract, when it has a comparative advantage over the low-cost firm in the supply of the goods 
and services contained in the offset packet. 
The following scenario should be considered. The high-cost firm, which has a less efficient technology 
than the low-cost firm, may decide to strengthen its bid by offering an offset packet in the form of marketing 
services for the companies from the procuring country. 
When the offset packet offered by the high-cost firm is more attractive, or more cost-efficient than the 
packet offered by the low-cost firm, the high-cost company may win the contract. In this case, the firm 
characterized by the more efficient manufacturing may loose the contract, when it has no relevant skills in, for 
example, marketing services. Thus, the offsets shift the emphasis from the price and quality of the basic 
product towards the content of the entire offset packet. The offering of the large offset packets could be the 
outcome of the negotiating strategy implemented by the high-cost company in the completion with the firms 
which are more efficient in the manufacturing of the basic product. 
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Hence, it can be concluded that the attempts of some governments to achieve a coordinated multilateral 
reduction of offset offers by the sellers from the developed countries may have a rather low probability of 
success (e.g., Code of Conduct on Offsets***). 
5. Conclusions 
The global proliferation of offsets are of major concern not only by the international organizations such as 
the World Bank, IMF, or WTO, but also by the defense contractors. A number of initiatives have been 
undertaken to limit the extent of this phenomenon. The analysis conducted in this paper allows to discuss the 
incentives for the defense contractors to use different size of offset packets in the bidding process for defense 
contracts. 
A static and a dynamic framework have been considered in this article. The static model leads to the 
conclusion that the strategy of cooperation among firms to offer low-size offset packets is not stable, therefore 
the attempts of governments to limit the extent of offsets may not be successful.   
However, the dynamic model enables to further refine the final conclusions. It has been found that for the 
relatively small additional costs of large offsets, the chance for a cooperation of contractors to supply low-size 
offset packets is not very high. When the additional costs of large offsets become relatively high, we may 
observe some firms offering small offset packets. 
Also, it has been pointed out that there could be other incentives for some contractors to increase the size of 
the offset packet. They may result from the cost differences in fulfilling the offset commitments. 
Overall, the analysis leads to the conclusion that the attempts of some governments to coordinate 
multilateral reduction of offset packages have a rather low chance of success on the contemporary defense 
markets. 
Clearly, further analysis of offset negotiations should be continued. Among the major directions of research 
in this context, we could name the impact of asymmetric information on the difference between the nominal 
and the real size of the offset packets offered by contractors. 
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